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Secret Writing on Dirty Paper: A Deterministic
View
Mustafa El-Halabi, Tie Liu, Costas Georghiades, and Shlomo Shamai (Shitz)
Abstract—Recently there has been a lot of success in using the
deterministic approach to provide approximate characterization
of Gaussian network capacity. In this paper, we take a determin-
istic view and revisit the problem of wiretap channel with side
information. A precise characterization of the secrecy capacity
is obtained for a linear deterministic model, which naturally
suggests a coding scheme which we show to achieve the secrecy
capacity of the degraded Gaussian model (dubbed as “secret
writing on dirty paper”) to within half a bit.
Index Terms—Dirty-paper coding, information-theoretic secu-
rity, linear deterministic model, side information, wiretap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
In information theory, an interesting and useful communi-
cation model is a state-dependent channel where the channel
states are non-causally known at the transmitter as side in-
formation. Of particular importance is a discrete-time channel
with real input and additive white Gaussian noise and inter-
ference, where the interference is non-causally known at the
transmitter as side information.
Costa [1] was the first to study this communication scenario,
which he whimsically coined as “writing on dirty paper.”
Based on an earlier result of Gel’fand and Pinsker [2], Costa
[1] proved the surprising result that the capacity of writing
on dirty paper is the same as that of writing on clean
paper without interference. Since [1], dirty-paper coding has
found a wide range of applications in digital watermarking
and network communications, particularly involving broadcast
scenarios.
Recent works [3] and [4] studied the problem of dirty-paper
coding in the presence of an additional eavesdropper, which
is a natural extension of Costa’s dirty-paper channel to the se-
crecy communication setting. In this scenario, which we dub as
“secret writing on dirty paper”, the legitimate receiver channel
is a dirty-paper channel of Costa. The signal received at the
eavesdropper, on the other hand, is assumed to be a degraded
version of the signal received at the legitimate receiver. An
achievable secrecy rate was established based on a double-
binning scheme and was shown to be the secrecy capacity of
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the channel under some channel parameter configurations [3],
[4]. For the general channel parameter configuration, however,
the secrecy capacity of the channel remains unknown.
In facing some challenging Gaussian network communi-
cation problems, recent advances [5], [6] in network infor-
mation theory advocate a deterministic approach and seeks
approximate characterization of the network capacity to within
finite bits (regardless of the received signal-to-noise ratios).
Motivated by the success of [5] and [6], in this paper we take
a deterministic view and revisit the problem of wiretap channel
with side information. A precise characterization of the secrecy
capacity is obtained for a linear deterministic model, which
naturally suggests a coding scheme which we show to achieve
the secrecy capacity of the degraded Gaussian model to within
half a bit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
first take a deterministic view at Costa’s dirty-paper channel
and provide an approximate characterization of the channel
capacity to within half a bit. Note that even though a precise
characterization of Costa’s dirty-paper channel is well known
[1], the proposed approximate characterization establishes a
framework for studying side-information problems via the
deterministic approach. Building on the framework of Sec. II,
in Sec. III we extend the deterministic approach to the problem
of secret writing on dirty paper and provide an approximate
characterization of the secrecy capacity to within half a bit.
A different but closely related communication scenario known
as secret-key agreement via dirty-paper coding is discussed in
Sec. IV. Finally, in Sec. V we conclude the paper with some
remarks.
II. WRITING ON DIRTY PAPER
A. Gaussian Model
Consider the dirty-paper channel of Costa [1], where the
received signal Y [i] at time index i is given by
Y [i] = hX [i] + gS[i] +N [i]. (1)
Here, X [i] is the channel input which is subject to a unit
average power constraint, N [i] and S[i] are independent stan-
dard Gaussian noise and interference and are independently
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across the time index i, and h
and g are the (real) channel coefficients corresponding to the
channel input and interference, respectively. The interference
S[i] is assumed to be non-causally known at the transmitter as
side information. The channel coefficients h and g are fixed
during communication and are assumed to be known at both
transmitter and receiver.
2The channel capacity, as shown by Costa [1], is given by
C = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)
where the input variable X is standard Gaussian and inde-
pendent of the known interference S, and U is an auxiliary
variable chosen as
U = hX +
h2
h2 + 1
gS. (2)
For this choice of auxiliary-input variable pair (U,X),
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) = 1
2
log(1 + h2)
which equals the capacity of the channel (1) when the inter-
ference S[i] is also known at the receiver.
B. Linear Deterministic Model
Consider the linear deterministic model [6] for Costa’s dirty-
paper channel (1), where the received signal Y [i] at time index
i is given by
Y [i] = Dq−nX [i]⊕Dq−mS[i]. (3)
Here, X [i] is the binary input vector of length q =
max{n,m}, S[i] is the i.i.d. interference vector whose ele-
ments are i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2, D = [dj,k] is the q × q down-
shift matrix with elements
dj,k =
{
1 if 2 ≤ j = k + 1 ≤ q
0 otherwise
and n and m are the integer channel gains corresponding to
the channel input and interference, respectively. The vector
interference S[i] is assumed to be non-causally known at the
transmitter as side information. The channel gains n and m
are fixed during communication and are assumed to be known
at both transmitter and receiver.
Following the result of Gel’fand and Pinsker [2], the capac-
ity of the linear deterministic dirty-paper channel (3) is given
by
C = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)
where the input variable X is an i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2 random
vector and independent of S, and U is an auxiliary variable
chosen as
U = Y = Dq−nX ⊕Dq−mS. (4)
For this choice of the auxiliary-input variable pair (U,X),
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) = I(Y ;Y )− I(Y ;S)
= H(Y )− I(Y ;S)
= H(Y |S)
= H(Dq−nX)
= rank(Dq−n)
= n
which equals the capacity of the channel (3) when the inter-
ference S[i] is also known at the receiver.
We emphasize that in (4), we may choose U = Y only
because Y here is a deterministic function of X and S.
In fact, for any deterministic Gel’fand-Pinsker channel (not
necessarily linear) where the channel output Y is a determin-
istic (bivariate) function of the channel input X and state S,
maxp(x|s)H(Y |S) is the capacity of the channel when the
channel state S is also known at the receiver. Thus, U = Y is
always an optimal choice for deterministic Gel’fand-Pinsker
channels, a fact which was also observed in [7] recently.
C. Connections between the Gaussian and the Linear Deter-
ministic Model
A quick comparison between the Gaussian (1) and the linear
deterministic (3) models reveals the following equivalence
relationship between these two models:
h←→ Dq−n and g ←→ Dq−m. (5)
Given this equivalence relationship, the optimal choice (4) of
auxiliary variable U for the linear deterministic model (3)
naturally suggests the following choice of auxiliary variable
U for the Gaussian model (1):
U = hX + gS (6)
where X is standard Gaussian and independent of S. Com-
pared with the optimal choice (2), the choice (6) of auxiliary
variable U is suboptimal. However, for this suboptimal choice
of auxiliary-input variable pair (U,X),
I(U ;S) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
g2
h2
)
and I(U ;Y ) = 1
2
log(1 + h2 + g2)
giving an achievable rate
R = [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)]+
=
[
1
2
log
(1 + h2 + g2)h2
h2 + g2
]+
≥
[
1
2
log(h2)
]+
which is always within half a bit of the actual channel capacity
C = 12 log(1+h
2). Here, we denote x+ := max{0, x} so that
the achievable rates are always nonnegative.
The fact that the choice (6) of auxiliary variable U leads to
an achievable rate which is always within half a bit of the dirty-
paper channel capacity is well known (see [8] for example).
However, it is interesting to see that such a choice comes up
naturally in the context of the deterministic approach.
III. SECRET WRITING ON DIRTY PAPER
Having understood how the linear deterministic model of [6]
may be used to obtain an approximate characterization of the
capacity of Costa’s dirty-paper channel, next we shall extend
the deterministic approach to the problem of secret writing on
dirty paper.
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel with side information.
A. Discrete Memoryless Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, consider a discrete-time memory-
less wiretap channel with transition probability p(y1, y2|x, s),
where X [i] is the channel input (at time index i), S[i] is
the channel state, and Y1[i] and Y2[i] are the received signals
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
The channel state S[i] is i.i.d. across the time index i and
is assumed to be non-causally known at the transmitter as
side information. The transmitter has a message W , which
is intended for the legitimate receiver but needs to be kept
asymptotically perfectly secret from the eavesdropper. Follow-
ing the classical works [9] and [10], it is required that
1
n
I(W ;Y n2 )→ 0 (7)
in the limit as the block length n → ∞, where Y n2 :=
(Y2[1], . . . , Y2[n]). The secrecy capacity Cs is defined as the
largest secrecy rate that can be achieved by a coding scheme.
Chen and Vinck [4] derived a single-letter lower bound on
the secrecy capacity (an achievable secrecy rate), which can
be written as
Cs ≥ maxp(u,x|s) min {I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;S),
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Y2)} (8)
where U is an auxiliary variable satisfying the Markov chain
U → (X,S)→ (Y1, Y2).
We also have the following simple upper bound on the
secrecy capacity.
Proposition 1: The secrecy capacity Cs of a discrete mem-
oryless wiretap channel p(y1, y2|x, s) with channel state S
non-causally known at the transmitter as side information can
be bounded from above as
Cs ≤ max
p(x|s)
min {I(X ;Y1|S), I(X,S;Y1|Y2)} . (9)
Note that maxp(x|s) I(X ;Y1|S) is an upper bound on
the Shannon capacity of the legitimate receiver channel by
giving the channel state S to the legitimate receiver, and
maxp(x|s) I(X,S;Y1|Y2) is an upper bound on the secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel by allowing the transmit
message W to be encoded by the channel state S (i.e., fully
action-dependent state [11]) and by giving the received signal
Y2 to the legitimate receiver. Here, a simple single-letterization
technique of Willems [12] allows the maximizations to be
moved outside the minimization. See Appendix A for the
details of the proof.
For semi-deterministic channels where the channel output at
the legitimate receiver is a deterministic (bivariate) function of
the channel input and state, the lower (8) and the upper (9)
bounds coincide, leading to a precise characterization of the
secrecy capacity. The result is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: Consider a discrete memoryless wiretap chan-
nel p(y1, y2|x, s) with channel state S non-causally known at
the transmitter as side information. If the received signal Y1
at the legitimate receiver is a deterministic function of the
channel input X and state S, i.e., Y1 = f(X,S) for some
bivariate function f , the secrecy capacity Cs of the channel is
given by
Cs = max
p(x|s)
min {H(Y1|S), H(Y1|Y2)} . (10)
Proof: The fact that
Cs ≥ max
p(x|s)
min {H(Y1|S), H(Y1|Y2)}
follows from the lower bound (8) by setting U = Y1 (we may
do so only because here Y1 is a deterministic function of X
and S), which gives
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;S) = H(Y1)− I(Y1;S) = H(Y1|S)
and similarly
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Y2) = H(Y1)−H(Y1|Y2) = H(Y1|Y2).
The converse part of the theorem follows from the upper
bound (9) and the fact that Y1 is a deterministic function of
(X,S), so we have
I(X ;Y1|S) = H(Y1|S)−H(Y1|X,S) = H(Y1|S)
and
I(X,S;Y1|Y2) = H(Y1|Y2)−H(Y1|X,S, Y2) = H(Y1|Y2).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Note that when the channel state S is deterministic, a semi-
deterministic wiretap channel with side information reduces
to a regular semi-deterministic wiretap channel without side
information. In this case, let S be a constant in (10) and we
have
Cs = max
p(x)
min {H(Y1), H(Y1|Y2)} = max
p(x)
H(Y1|Y2)
which recovered the result of [13] on the secrecy capacity of
the semi-deterministic wiretap channel (without side informa-
tion).
B. Linear Deterministic Model
Next, let us use the result of Theorem 1 to determine the
secrecy capacity of a linear deterministic wiretap channel with
side information. In this model, the received signals (at time
index i) at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are
given by
Y1[i] = D
q−n1X [i]⊕Dq−m1S[i]
Y2[i] = D
q−n2X [i]⊕Dq−m2S[i] (11)
4where X [i] is the binary input vector of length q =
max{n1, n2,m1,m2}, S[i] is the i.i.d. vector interference
whose elements are i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2, D is the q × q
down-shift matrix, and n1, n2, m1 and m2 are the integer
channel gains. The vector interference S[i] is assumed to be
non-causally known at the transmitter as side information.
The channel gains n1, n2, m1 and m2 are fixed during
communication and are assumed to be known at all terminals.
The following theorem provides an explicit characterization
of the secrecy capacity of the linear deterministic wiretap
channel (11) with side information.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity Cs of the linear deter-
ministic wiretap channel (11) with side information is given
by
Cs =


n1, if n1 −m1 6= n2 −m2,
n1 ≤ m1 or n2 ≤ m2
max {m1, n1 − n2 +m2} ,
if n1 −m1 6= n2 −m2,
n1 > m1 and n2 > m2
(n1 − n2)+, if n1 −m1 = n2 −m2.
(12)
To prove Theorem 2, let us first prove the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2: The secrecy capacity Cs of the linear deter-
ministic wiretap channel (11) with side information is given
by
Cs = min
{
n1, rank
([
A
B
])
− rank(B)
}
(13)
where
A :=
[
Dq−n1 Dq−m1
]
and B :=
[
Dq−n2 Dq−m2
]
.
(14)
Proof: To prove (13), we shall show that for the linear
deterministic model (11), both H(Y1|S) and H(Y1|Y2) are
simultaneously maximized when X is an i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2
random vector and independent of S.
First,
H(Y1|S) = H(Dq−n1X |S)
≤ H(Dq−n1X)
≤ rank(Dq−n1 )
= n1 (15)
where the equalities hold when X is an i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2
random vector and independent of S.
To show that H(Y1|Y2) is also maximized when X is an
i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2 random vector and independent of S, we
shall need the following technical lemma, which can be proved
using a counting argument as provided in Appendix B.
Lemma 1: For any matrices A and B in F2 (Galois field of
size 2) that have the same number of columns,
maxH(AZ|BZ) = rank
([
A
B
])
− rank(B) (16)
where the maximization is over all possible binary random
vector Z . The maximum is achieved when Z is an i.i.d.
Bernoulli-1/2 random vector.
Now let
Z :=
[
X
S
]
.
By Lemma 1,
H(Y1|Y2) = H(AZ|BZ)
≤ rank
([
A
B
])
− rank(B) (17)
where the equality holds when X is an i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2
random vector and independent of S.
Substituting (15) and (17) into (10) completes the proof of
the proposition.
Given Proposition 2, the explicit characterization (12) of the
secrecy capacity Cs can be obtained from (13) by evaluating
the rank of the matrices [
A
B
]
and B. The details of the evaluation process are provided in
Appendix C.
C. Degraded Gaussian Model
Finally, let us consider the Gaussian wiretap channel where
the received signals (at time index i) at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper are given by
Y1[i] = h1X [i] + g1S[i] +N1[i]
Y2[i] = h2X [i] + g2S[i] +N2[i].
(18)
Here, X [i] is the channel input which is subject to a unit
average power constraint, Nk[i], k = 1, 2 and S[i] are
independent standard Gaussian noise and interference and are
i.i.d. across the time index i, and h1, h2, g1 and g2 are the
(real) channel coefficients. The interference S[i] is assumed to
be non-causally known at the transmitter as side information.
The channel coefficients h1, h2, g1 and g2 are fixed during
communication and are assumed to be known at all terminals.
A single-letter expression for an achievable secrecy rate was
given in (8), which involves an auxiliary variable U . However,
it is not clear what would be a reasonable choice of U , letting
alone finding an optimal one that maximizes the achievable
secrecy rate expression (8). On the other hand, for the linear
deterministic model (11), it is clear from Theorem 1 and
Proposition 2 that the following choice of auxiliary variable
U is optimal:
U = Y1 = D
q−n1X ⊕Dq−m1S (19)
where X is an i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2 random vector and inde-
pendent of S.
Based on the equivalence relationship (5) between the
Gaussian and the linear deterministic model and the success
of Sec. II for Costa’s dirty-paper channel, the optimal choice
(19) of auxiliary variable U for the linear deterministic model
(11) suggests the following choice of auxiliary variable U for
the Gaussian model (18):
U = h1X + g1S (20)
5where X is standard Gaussian and independent of S. For this
choice of auxiliary-input variable pair (U,X),
I(U ;S) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
g21
h21
)
(21)
I(U ;Y1) =
1
2
log(1 + h21 + g
2
1) (22)
and I(U ;Y2) =
1
2
log
(h21 + g
2
1)(1 + h
2
2 + g
2
2)
h21 + g
2
1 + (h1g2 − h2g1)2
(23)
giving
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;S) = 1
2
log
(1 + h21 + g
2
1)h
2
1
h21 + g
2
1
and
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Y2)
=
1
2
log
(1 + h21 + g
2
1)[h
2
1 + g
2
1 + (h1g2 − h2g1)2]
(h21 + g
2
1)(1 + h
2
2 + g
2
2)
.
By the single-letter achievable secrecy rate expression (8),
Rs =
(
min
{
1
2 log
(1+h2
1
+g2
1
)h2
1
h2
1
+g2
1
,
1
2 log
(1+h2
1
+g2
1
)[h2
1
+g2
1
+(h1g2−h2g1)
2]
(h2
1
+g2
1
)(1+h2
2
+g2
2
)
})+ (24)
is an achievable secrecy rate for the Gaussian wiretap channel
(18) with side information.
Following the works [3] and [4], below we focus on the
special case where
h2 = βh1 and g2 = βg1 (25)
for some |β| ≤ 1. Note that the secrecy capacity of the channel
(18) does not depend on the correlation between the additive
Gaussian noise N1[i] and N2[i], so we may write
N2[i] = βN1[i] +N [i]
where N [i] is Gaussian with zero mean and variance 1 − β2
and independent of N1[i]. Thus, for the special case of (25),
the channel (18) can be equivalently written as
Y1[i] = h1X [i] + g1S[i] +N1[i]
Y2[i] = βY1[i] +N [i]
(26)
i.e., the received signal Y2[i] at the eavesdropper is degraded
with respect to the the received signal Y1[i] at the legitimate
receiver.
Following [1], an interesting interpretation of the degraded
Gaussian model (26) is “secret writing on dirty paper.” In this
scenario, a user intends to convey (to a legitimate receiver)
a confidential message on a piece of paper with preexisting
dirt on it. The legitimate receive has access to the original
paper with the message written on it and hence can decode
the intended message. On the other hand, the eavesdropper can
only access a noisy copy of the original paper, from which
essentially no information on the conveyed message can be
inferred.
Next, we show that for the degraded Gaussian model (26),
the achievable secrecy rate (24) is always within half a bit of
the secrecy capacity. The result is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: For the degraded Gaussian wiretap channel
(26) with side information, the secrecy capacity Cs can be
bounded as(
min
{
1
2 log
(1+h2
1
+g2
1
)h2
1
h2
1
+g2
1
, 12 log
1+h2
1
+g2
1
1+β2(h2
1
+g2
1
)
})+
≤
Cs ≤ min
{
1
2 log(1 + h
2
1),
1
2 log
2(h2
1
+g2
1
)+1
2β2(h2
1
+g2
1
)+1
}
.
(27)
Moreover, the lower bound here is always within half a bit of
the upper bound.
Proof: The lower bound in (27) follows from (24) and
the degradedness assumption (25). To prove the upper bound,
note that for any input variable X such that E[X2] ≤ 1 we
have
I(X ;Y1|S) = h(Y1|S)− h(Y1|X,S)
= h(h1X +N1|S)− h(N1)
≤ h(h1X +N1)− h(N1)
≤ 1
2
log(1 + h21Var(X))
≤ 1
2
log(1 + h21). (28)
Furthermore,
I(X,S;Y1|Y2)
= h(Y1|Y2)− h(Y1|X,S, Y2)
= h(Y1|βY1 +N)− h(N1|βN1 +N)
= h(Y1|βY1 +N)− 1
2
log
(
2πe(1− β2)) . (29)
By an inequality of Thomas [14, Lemma 1] and the indepen-
dence between Y1 and N ,
h(Y1|βY1 +N) ≤ 1
2
log
2πeVar(Y1)(1− β2)
β2Var(Y1) + (1− β2) . (30)
Note that the right-hand side of (30) is a monotone increasing
function of Var(Y1), which can be bounded from above as
Var(Y1) = Var(h1X + g1S +N1)
= Var(h1X + g1S) + 1
≤ 2 (Var(h1X) + Var(g1S)) + 1
≤ 2h21 + 2g21 + 1.
Hence,
h(Y1|βY1 +N)
≤ 1
2
log
2πe(2h21 + 2g
2
1 + 1)(1− β2)
β2(2h21 + 2g
2
1 + 1) + (1− β2)
=
1
2
log
2πe(2h21 + 2g
2
1 + 1)(1− β2)
2β2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
. (31)
Substituting (31) into (29), we have
I(X,S;Y1|Y2) ≤ 1
2
log
2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
2β2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
. (32)
Further substituting (28) and (32) into (9) establishes the upper
bound in (27).
6To show that the lower bound is always within half a bit of
the upper bound, let us define
a :=
1
2
log(1 + h21)
b :=
1
2
log
2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
2β2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
c :=
1
2
log
(1 + h21 + g
2
1)h
2
1
h21 + g
2
1
and d := 1
2
log
1 + h21 + g
2
1
1 + β2(h21 + g
2
1)
.
We shall consider the following two cases separately.
Case 1: h21 < 1. In this case,
a =
1
2
log(1 + h21) <
1
2
and the gap between the upper and the lower bound can be
bounded from above as
min{a, b} − (min{c, d})+ ≤ min{a, b} ≤ a < 1
2
. (33)
Case 2: h21 ≥ 1. In this case,
a− c = 1
2
log(1 + h21)−
1
2
log
(1 + h21 + g
2
1)h
2
1
h21 + g
2
1
≤ 1
2
log(1 + h21)−
1
2
log(h21)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
1
h21
)
≤ 1
2
. (34)
Note that for any channel parameters h1, g1 and β,
b− d = 1
2
log
2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
2β2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
− 1
2
log
1 + h21 + g
2
1
1 + β2(h21 + g
2
1)
=
1
2
log
[
2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
1 + h21 + g
2
1
· 1 + β
2(h21 + g
2
1)
2β2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
]
≤ 1
2
log
2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
1 + h21 + g
2
1
≤ 1
2
log
2(h21 + g
2
1) + 2
1 + h21 + g
2
1
=
1
2
(35)
and for any real scalers a, b, c and d,
min{a, b} − (min{c, d})+
≤ min{a, b} −min{c, d}
= max {min{a, b} − c,min{a, b} − d}
= max{a− c, b− d}. (36)
Substituting (34) and (35) into (36), we have
min{a, b} − (min{c, d})+ ≤ max
{
1
2
,
1
2
}
=
1
2
. (37)
Combining the above two cases proves that the lower bound
in (27) is always within half a bit of the upper bound. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
Finally, we note that the work [3] considered, as a heuristic
choice, the auxiliary variable
U = h1X + αg1S (38)
where X is standard Gaussian and independent of S, and α is
chosen to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. A closed-form
expression for the maximizing α can be written as
α∗ =


h2
1
h2
1
+1
, if 0 ≤ h21 < h21L
β2h2
1
(
|g1|+
√
h2
1
+g2
1
+1/β2
)
|g1|(1+β2h21)
, if h21L ≤ h21 < h21H
1, if h21 ≥ h21H
where
h21L =
(
−g
2
1
2
− 1 + |g1|
2
√
g21 +
4
β2
− 4
)+
and h21H = −
g21
2
+
|g1|
2
√
g21 +
4
β2
.
Thus, for h21 ≥ h21H , the heuristic choice (38) with the
maximizing α coincides with the choice U = h1X + g1S
suggested by the linear deterministic model.
A numerical comparison between the achievable secrecy
rates for choosing α = α∗ and α = 1 in (38) as well
as the upper bound in (27) is provided in Figure 2. As we
can see, when h21 (which represents the received signal-to-
noise ratio at the legitimate receiver) is small, the choice
α = 1 (as suggested by the linear deterministic model) can be
very suboptimal in maximizing the achievable secrecy rate.
However, in this case, the secrecy capacity of the channel
is also small, so the achievable secrecy rate given by the
suboptimal choice α = 1 remains within half a bit of the
secrecy capacity. For small h21, substantial improvement to
the achievable secrecy rate can be made by optimizing over
α. In fact, when h21 ≤ h21L, the achievable secrecy rate given
α =
h2
1
1+h2
1
coincides with the upper bound and hence gives
the exact secrecy capacity of the channel. When h21 is large,
the maximizing α approaches 1 (it is exactly equal to 1 when
h21 ≥ h21H), and both choices lead to achievable secrecy rates
which are within half a bit of the secrecy capacity.
IV. SECRET-KEY AGREEMENT VIA DIRTY-PAPER CODING
A different but closely related communication scenario is
secret-key agreement via dirty-paper coding, which was first
considered in [15]. In this setting, the channel model is
exactly the same as that for secret writing on dirty paper.
The difference is in the goal of communication. For secret
writing on dirty paper, the goal is to convey to the legitimate
receiver a secret message W , which is pre-chosen and hence
is independent of the known interference {S[i]}. For secret-
key agreement, the goal is to establish, between the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver, an agreement on a secret key K ,
which must be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from the
eavesdropper, i.e.,
1
n
I(K;Y n2 )→ 0
in the limit as the block length n→∞. The secret-key capac-
ity CK is defined as the largest entropy rate (1/n) logH(K)
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Fig. 2. A numerical comparison between the achievable secrecy rates for choosing α = α∗ and α = 1 in (38). Both α∗ and the achievable secrecy rate Rs
are plotted as a function of h2
1
, while g1 and β are fixed to be 1 and 0.5, respectively.
that can be achieved by a coding scheme. Unlike the problem
of secret writing on dirty paper, the secret key K can be
potentially correlated with the known interference {S[i]}.
Hence, the secret-key capacity CK is at least as large as the
secrecy capacity Cs for the same wiretap channel.
For a general discrete memoryless wiretap channel with
side information, the secret-key capacity CK is unknown. The
following lower and upper bounds were established in [15]:
max
p(u,x|s)
[I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Y2)] ≤ CK ≤ max
p(x|s)
I(X,S;Y1|Y2)
(39)
where U is an auxiliary variable satisfying the Markov chain
U → (X,S)→ (Y1, Y2) and such that
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;S) ≥ 0. (40)
For semi-deterministic wiretap channels where the received
signal Y1 at the legitimate receiver is a deterministic bivariate
function of the channel input X and state S, the lower bound
in (39) with the choice of auxiliary variable U = Y1 coincides
with the upper bound, giving an exact characterization of the
secret-key capacity
CK = max
p(x|s)
H(Y1|Y2). (41)
Note here that the choice U = Y1 always satisfies the
constraint (40).
For the linear deterministic wiretap channel (11) with side
information, by Lemma 1 the conditional entropy H(Y1|Y2)
is maximized when the input variable X is standard Gaussian
and independent of S. By the equivalence relationship (5)
between the linear deterministic and the Gaussian model, this
suggests the following choice of auxiliary variable U for the
degraded Gaussian model (26):
U = h1X + g1S (42)
where X is standard Gaussian and independent of S, as
long as (40) is satisfied. Substituting (42), (21)–(23), and the
degradedness assumption (25) into (39) and (40), we have the
following lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity
CK of the degraded Gaussian model (26):
1
2
log
1 + h21 + g
2
1
1 + β2(h21 + g
2
1)
≤ CK ≤ 1
2
log
2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1
2β2(h21 + g
2
1) + 1(43)
for all channel coefficients h1 and g1 such that1
h21 ≥ h21T := −
g21
2
+
|g1|
2
√
g21 + 4. (44)
By (35), the lower bound in (43) is always within half a bit
of the upper bound.
We mention here that [15] also considered, as a heuristic
choice, the auxiliary variable U of form (42) where X is
standard Gaussian. However, instead of choosing X to be
independent of S as suggested by the linear deterministic
model, [15] considered X which is correlated with S and with
correlation coefficient ρ = E[XS] = ρ∗, where
ρ∗ =
√
1− h
2
1 + g
2
1
(1 + h21 + g
2
1)h
2
1
· sgn(h1g1). (45)
1The upper bound is valid for all channel parameters. Due to the constraint
(40), when h2
1
< h2
1T
the linear deterministic model does not appear to
provide any insight on how to choose the auxiliary variable U for the degraded
Gaussian model.
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Fig. 3. A numerical comparison between the achievable secret-key rates for
choosing ρ = ρ∗ and ρ = 0 in (42). The achievable secret-key rate RK
are plotted as a function of h2
1
, while g1 and β are fixed to be 1 and 0.5,
respectively.
Here, sgn(x) denotes the sign of real scalar x. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that condition (44) guarantees the existence of
ρ∗. A numerical comparison between the achievable secret-key
rates for choosing the correlation coefficient ρ = ρ∗ and ρ = 0
as well as the upper bound in (43) is provided in Figure 3. As
we can see, even though the choice ρ = 0 is suboptimal in
maximizing the achievable secret-key rate, both choices lead
to achievable secret-key rates that are within half a bit of the
secret-key capacity for h21 ≥ h21T .
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we took a deterministic view and revisited the
problem of wiretap channel with side information. A precise
characterization of the secrecy capacity was obtained for a
linear deterministic model, which naturally suggests a coding
scheme which we showed to achieve the secrecy capacity of
the degraded Gaussian model (dubbed as “secret writing on
dirty paper”) to within half a bit.
This paper falls in the line of using the linear deterministic
model to provide approximate characterization of Gaussian
network capacity, an approach which has become increasingly
popular in information theory literature. However, our method
is somewhat different from most of the practices along this
line of research. In literature, a common practice has been
to first gain “insight” from the capacity-achieving scheme for
the linear deterministic model and then translate the success
to the Gaussian model at the scheme level. To the best
of our understanding, such translations are more art than
science. For the problems that we considered in this paper,
the translation of success from the linear deterministic model
to the Gaussian model was done at the level of a single-letter
description of channel capacity and hence was much more
systematic. Our ongoing work aims at understanding to what
extent this method can be applied to more complex network
communication scenarios.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
By Fano’s inequality, any achievable secrecy rate Rs must
satisfy
n(Rs − ǫn) ≤ I(W ;Y n1 )
≤ I(W ;Y n1 , Sn)
= I(W ;Y n1 |Sn)
≤ I(Xn;Y n1 |Sn)
= H(Y n1 |Sn)−H(Y n1 |Xn, Sn)
= H(Y n1 |Sn)−
n∑
i=1
H(Y1[i]|X [i], S[i])
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y1[i]|S[i])−
n∑
i=1
H(Y1[i]|X [i], S[i])
= n[H(Y1,Q|SQ, Q)−H(Y1,Q|XQ, SQ, Q)]
= n[H(Y1,Q|SQ, Q)−H(Y1,Q|XQ, SQ)]
≤ n[H(Y1,Q|SQ)−H(Y1,Q|XQ, SQ)]
= n · I(XQ;Y1,Q|SQ)
where ǫn → 0 in the limit as n → ∞, and Q is a standard
time-sharing variable.
Similarly, for any achievable secrecy rate Rs we have
n(Rs − ǫn)
≤ I(W ;Y n1 )− I(W ;Y n2 )
≤ I(W ;Y n1 , Y n2 )− I(W ;Y n2 )
= I(W ;Y n1 |Y n2 )
≤ I(Xn, Sn;Y n1 |Y n2 )
= H(Y n1 |Y n2 )−H(Y n1 |Xn, Sn, Y n2 )
= H(Y n1 |Y n2 )−
n∑
i=1
H(Y1[i]|X [i], S[i], Y2[i])
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y1[i]|Y2[i])−
n∑
i=1
H(Y1[i]|X [i], S[i], Y2[i])
= n[H(Y1,Q|Y2,Q, Q)−H(Y1,Q|XQ, SQ, Y2,Q, Q)]
= n[H(Y1,Q|Y2,Q, Q)−H(Y1,Q|XQ, SQ, Y2,Q)]
≤ n[H(Y1,Q|Y2,Q)−H(Y1,Q|XQ, SQ, Y2,Q)]
= n · I(XQ, SQ;Y1,Q|Y2,Q).
Note that the channel states are memoryless, so SQ has
the same distribution as S[i] for any i = 1, . . . , n. The
channel is also memoryless, so the conditional distribution of
(Y1,Q, Y2,Q) given (XQ, SQ) is given by the channel transi-
tion probability p(y1, y2|x, s). Letting XQ = X , SQ = S,
Y1,Q = Y1, Y2,Q = Y2, and n → ∞ completes the proof of
the proposition.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let Z be an i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2 vector. We have
H(AZ|BZ) = H
([
A
B
]
Z
)
−H(BZ)
= rank
([
A
B
])
− rank(B).
9We thus conclude that
maxH(AZ|BZ) ≥ rank
([
A
B
])
− rank(B). (46)
To prove the reverse inequality, let us consider the null space
of B and its coset partition based on the null space of[
A
B
]
.
Fix BZ = b. Then, any solution Z can be written as the sum
of a particular solution Zp and a vector Zh in the null space
of B. Note that all vectors Zh in the same coset of the null
space of B relative to the null space of[
A
B
]
give the same value for AZh. Thus, the number of different
values that AZ can take for any given value of b equals the
number of cosets in the null space of B, which is given by
2
nullitiy(B)−nullity



 A
B




= 2
rank



 A
B



−rank(B)
.
We thus conclude that
maxH(AZ|BZ) ≤ rank
([
A
B
])
− rank(B). (47)
Combining (46) and (47) completes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The matrix B is a horizontal stack of two down-shift
matrices with rank n2 and m2, respectively. Since both sub-
matrices are in reduced row-echelon form, it suffices to count
the number of nonzero rows of B to find its rank:
rank(B) = q −min{q − n2, q −m2}
= max{n2,m2}.
The matrix
G :=
[
A
B
]
=
[
Dq−n1 Dq−m1
Dq−n2 Dq−m2
]
is formed by vertically stacking two matrices A and B. Thus,
evaluating the rank of G is equivalent to counting the number
of zero rows along with the number of redundant nonzero rows
between A and B (denoted by dAB):
rank(G) = 2q −min{q − n1, q −m1} −
min{q − n2, q −m2} − dAB
= max{n1,m1}+max{n2,m2} − dAB .
To calculate dAB , let us consider the following five cases
separately:
Case 1: Either n1 ≤ m1 and n2 > m2, or n2 ≤ m2 and
n1 > m1. In this case, all nonzero rows of G are independent
so dAB = 0. By Proposition 2,
Cs = min{n1,max{n1,m1} − 0} = n1.
Case 2: n1 ≤ m1 and n2 ≤ m2, but m1 − n1 6= m2 − n2.
In this case, the redundant nonzero rows of G are given by
the redundant rows between the top m1−n1 nonzero rows of
A and the top m2 − n2 nonzero rows of B. Hence, dAB =
min{m1 − n1,m2 − n2}. By Proposition 2,
Cs = min{n1,m1 −min{m1 − n1,m2 − n2}}
= min{n1,max{n1,m1 −m2 + n2}}
= n1.
Case 3: n1 > m1 and n2 > m2, but m1 − n1 6= m2 − n2.
In this case, the redundant nonzero rows of G are given by
the redundant rows between the top n1−m1 nonzero rows of
A and the top n2 −m2 nonzero rows of B. Hence, dAB =
min{n1 −m1, n2 −m2}. By Proposition 2,
Cs = min{n1, n1 −min{n1 −m1, n2 −m2}}
= n1 −min{n1 −m1, n2 −m2}
= max{m1, n1 − n2 +m2}.
Case 4: n1 −m1 = n2 −m2 and n1 ≥ m1. In this case,
the redundant nonzero rows of G correspond to the redundant
nonzero rows of [
Dq−n1
Dq−n2
]
so dAB = min{n1, n2}. By Proposition 2,
Cs = min{n1, n1 −min{n1, n2}}
= n1 −min{n1, n2}
= (n1 − n2)+.
Case 5: n1 −m1 = n2 −m2 and n1 < m1. In this case,
the redundant nonzero rows of G correspond to the redundant
nonzero rows of [
Dq−m1
Dq−m2
]
so dAB = min{m1,m2}. By Proposition 2,
Cs = min{n1,m1 −min{m1,m2}}
= min{n1, (m1 −m2)+}
= min{n1, (n1 − n2)+}
= (n1 − n2)+.
Combining the results from the above five cases completes
the proof of (12) and hence Theorem 2.
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